When Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s now infamous 2010 remarks were widely published in January, the world questioned whether he still believed that Israelis were the “descendants of apes and pigs.” A more pertinent question, though, may be whether these statements represented the beliefs of the organization that helped bring Morsi to power. For if these are in fact the views of a well-established and extensive organization with members in every level of government, they may be cause for even greater alarm.
In Arabic this organization is known as Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, but across the world it is known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Established in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood was initially conceived to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy and create an Islamic theocracy. Its ideology is violent jihad—Islamic holy war against the enemies of Allah, including all non-believers of Islam. The Brotherhood ultimately wanted to unify the Middle East under one Islamic caliphate, committing and sponsoring terrorist acts throughout the 20th century in pursuit of this objective. Among these acts was a failed assassination attempt on then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, giving rise to the terrorist group Hamas in Palestine, and influencing the leaders of al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
A Brotherhood Rising
Though illegal under President Mubarak, the Brotherhood became increasingly political in the 1990s and 2000s, with many members winning seats in Parliament over the years, including 88 in 2005. By this time, frustration with Mubarak’s reign was growing, but, as stated by George Washington University professor Nathan Brown in an interview with the HPR, “while disillusionment with the Egyptian regime was widespread, most opposition was inchoate. The Brotherhood was Egypt’s leading opposition movement, a tightly disciplined opposition organization with hundreds of thousands of followers.”
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution brought the Muslim Brotherhood fully back into the public arena, and as the most populous and organized political group in Egypt, it quickly harnessed significant support from the revolution. However, many of the youth and liberals, who began the protests, felt the Brotherhood took over the revolution and began pushing for Islamic law rather than democracy. This accusation does not seem to be unfounded. Vice Chairman of the Egyptian Democratic Academy and co-founder of the April 6th Movement, Esraa Abdelfattah, explained to the HPR that, to win political support, the Brotherhood “always talks by the voice of Islam … They also receive great amounts of illegal money from Qatar and the Gulf. They use this money to give the poor, illiterate people goats, rice, sugar, and health services. Money and religion…give them more voters.” With a poverty rate of 25.2 percent and an illiteracy rate of 28 percent according to Egypt’s 2010-2011 financial report, those in need of simple services represent a significant base of political support for the Brotherhood.
In the 2012 presidential elections, this base came through; the Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), nominated Mohamed Morsi as their candidate, who subsequently won the election. In Egypt and around the world, this was seen as a victory for Islamists over secularists, but University of Washington professor Ellis Goldberg has a different view of the situation: “The notion that the Brotherhood is religious and the opposition is secular is misleading—everyone in Egypt is religious. Egyptians are concerned … with authoritarianism. The Mubarak era was about stagnation; it was impossible to challenge Mubarak politically. The question now is, can the Brotherhood, an organization that is internally authoritarian and not transparent, lead this society to be democratic and transparent?” he told the HPR.
The Conservative Chameleons
Morsi appeared to answer this question with a resounding ‘no’ following his election, as members of the Brotherhood flooded the Egyptian government. He defied Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court by reinstating the heavily Islamist parliament after it was disbanded earlier in the year. Going further, he issued a decree granting himself broad executive powers and, in mid-November, suspended judicial authority over his actions. These abuses of power certainly support professor Goldberg’s concerns.
Right at this time, however, Morsi became an important broker in the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Palestine after attacks broke out between the two in September. This was a major moment for Morsi and the Brotherhood, which has been known to support Hamas and oppose the recognition of Israel as a state. Professor Brown stated, “Hamas speaks of the Brotherhood as ‘the mother movement’ and ideological ties are strong. The Brotherhood does not favor a two-state solution, but I think it accepted Morsi’s role [in the ceasefire agreement].” Should Morsi continue to support peace between Israel and Palestine, while maintaining the backing of the Brotherhood, it would be an encouraging sign that the group can play a positive and influential political force in the peace process.
However, Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s actions at home leave little hope that Egypt will become a stable democracy. Just weeks after the ceasefire agreement, at Morsi’s insistence, Islamists in the Egyptian Parliament hastily drafted and pushed through a constitution that strongly complies with Sharia Law. All liberal and Coptic members of Parliament withdrew from the vote in protest. Though the constitution was ratified by a national vote, less than 33 percent of the voting population participated, with many protesting against it, including the National Salvation Front, or NSF, and the Coptic community. There have been numerous claims of voter fraud, but Morsi’s administration has declined to investigate any of them. Despite widespread fears that Egypt is becoming more Islamic, Professor Brown does not see a major legal difference, stating, “Since 1980, the constitution has proclaimed that ‘the principles of the Islamic Sharia’ are ‘the main source of legislation’. The Brotherhood’s interpretation of that phrase is a bit more demanding that of the Mubarak regime, but it seeks to implement it through the democratic process.”
While this may be true, Egypt’s opposition prefers an essentially secular democracy that is with equality across gender and religious lines. According to Brown, the Brotherhood “has its own set of positions that are not predicated on gender equality but represent what might be seen as a more paternalistic vision. It has some resonance among large parts of Egyptian society.” Still, this “paternalistic vision” is not acceptable to many Egyptians and is a major point of contention for the opposition. Abdelfattah said, “The constitution does not give women the same rights as men if a woman is [legally or financially] responsible for her family. It does not explicitly allow a woman’s name to be on district voting lists.” Only Egyptian citizens can run for political office, but citizenship is not clearly defined in the constitution. Morsi has stated that women are citizens in Egypt, but if this statement is not put into law, it can easily be disregarded. She also explained that the Brotherhood has aligned the electoral districts to promote the FJP and to disadvantage smaller parties; “The Brotherhood controls the elections and they are running them without international monitoring.”
Furthermore, with Sharia Law as the ultimate source of legislative authority, three articles in particular become particularly concerning for secularists, women, practitioners of minority religions, and defenders of free speech:
Article 10: The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family, its cohesion and stability, and to protect its moral values, all as regulated by law.
Article 12: The State shall safeguard the cultural and linguistic constituents of society, and foster the Arabization of education, science and knowledge.
Article 44: Insult or abuse of all religious messengers and prophets shall be prohibited.
These articles authorize government control of family life, moral values, and education based on the principles of Sharia Law, and no one is allowed to speak against Islam. Additionally, Amnesty International is concerned the constitution “may impact … the rights of women, and may be used as a justification to uphold legislation which currently discriminates against women in respect of marriage, divorce and family life.”
No Room for Compromise
Egypt’s opposition movement, led by the NSF, has demanded serious changes to the constitution to represent the rights of minorities and women and to guarantee a secular state. The people of Egypt do not want to be repressed again, and yet, Abdelfattah believes this is exactly what is happening: “The Brotherhood wants to have full control of the country. They didn’t want anyone to participate with them in ruling this country. I don’t think their ideology is compatible with democracy.” Indeed, Professor Brown also noted, “In the eyes of its critics, the Brotherhood is grasping for political power”, but he went on to say that “in the eyes of its supporters, the Brotherhood stands out for having leadership that is not personally ambitious and that seeks the good of society in accordance with prevailing conservative religious values.” In evaluating whether or not the Brotherhood is a moderate political force, it should be noted that a significant portion of Egypt’s population adheres to Sharia Law in their private lives. After decades of discrimination against women and minorities, “moderate” through an Egyptian lens may mean striking a balance between ultraconservative views and the principles of democracy.
In any case, however, the Brotherhood does not have the right to suppress the opposition simply for expressing its relatively liberal views. The opposition wants to have a serious dialogue with Morsi and the Brotherhood to reform the constitution, but so far, Morsi has refused. Abdelfattah relayed, “I have not seen anything to suggest that he will make any compromises. And it is not just Morsi. I don’t believe that the Muslim brotherhood will work with the opposition at all.”
Since the Constitution passed in December, protests against Morsi’s administration have grown, many involving violent clashes between police and demonstrators. This is evidence that, as Professor Goldberg said, “The revolution is not over. Egyptians have not bought into the idea that elections will guarantee democracy.” As someone in the streets of Egypt, participating in and leading these protests, Abdelfattah confirmed Professor Goldberg’s statement and expressed her concern that, “If Morsi does not compromise, the unrest will continue. There will be instability, the elections will be more difficult, and the people will be in the streets all the time.”
But rather than listening to the voices in the streets, Morsi and the Brotherhood have opted for suppression. “The people are coming to demonstrations against the Brotherhood, and they are using the same tools as Mubarak to target and kill them, tear gas and violence. It is against freedom and against human rights,” Abdelfattah insisted. The people are asking why Mubarak is in jail for killing protestors, while Morsi does not face punishment for the same.
If the Brotherhood is to be considered a moderate political force in Egypt, its leaders must understand that competition and debate are integral parts of democracy. Such competition can only happen if the political field is not skewed in favor of the FJP, and as Professor Brown explained, “The problem in Egypt is that political actors have not agreed on the basic rules of the political game. I think that is a very worrying sign.” While he believes that the Brotherhood has been “heavy-handed” with the opposition, he doubts that a different outcome would have resulted otherwise.
The Brotherhood is undoubtedly the most organized and populous political group in Egypt. They fully control the executive and legislative branches of the government and have suppressed the independence of the judiciary. On an individual level, as Professor Goldberg stated, “the government has ignored serious acts of criminal violence,” neglecting basic property rights and individual freedoms.
Thus far, Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s actions have made the prospects of true democracy in Egypt look grim. There is nothing moderate about gender and religious discrimination. There is nothing moderate about monopolizing the political process. And there is nothing moderate about a government killing its own people when they are demanding democratic change. The Brotherhood may no longer want to create an Islamic caliphate, but they are not a moderate political force, and the people of Egypt deserve better. If the Brotherhood is to be legitimate in the eyes of all its citizens, it needs to recognize that it has a fundamental responsibility to deliver Egyptians out of dictatorship and into democracy by working with the other political groups striving toward this goal.
