Yesterday, October 11, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their “extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons.” This award must be seen as an endorsement of the perceived success of the OPCW in working to arrange for the destruction of chemical weapons and averting a once-imminent military strike on Syria. The Chemical Weapons Convention has been used toward this recent success in the international arena, but recognition of this modest progress must not obscure the major failures of the disarmament movement, and the many steps still necessary for chemical weapons disarmament to succeed.
The chemical weapons situation in Syria dominated headlines around the world a few weeks ago. The triggering event: an August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack in Syria that left nearly 1,500 civilians dead. The United States and France, among others, threatened military strikes as retribution for Syria “violating well established international norms,” as President Barack Obama put it. Military strikes faced strong political opposition, with the British Parliament voting against Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposal, and Congress leaning strongly against military action. On September 9, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Assad “could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons” to avoid a military strike, and this rhetorical plan garnered traction, with Russia and Syria emerging in support of this as a formal disarmament plan. The United States and Russia negotiated on the details of a potential UN Security Council resolution, and on September 28 a resolution on Syria’s chemical weapons passed the UNSC.
This passage of this UNSC resolution enabled the OPCW to undertake rapid destruction and verification procedures. Without the support of the UNSC, the OPCW would not have had the UN permission or funding necessary to execute its current mandate. The OPCW was founded under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and all states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are members of the OPCW. The OPCW began verification in Syria on October 1, and destruction of Category 3 chemical weaponry (chemical weapons-related materials) commenced on October 6. Syria has not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, but Syria’s accession to the convention is a mandatory contingent of this disarmament plan.
Syria’s path to disarmament is a complicated one, largely due to its status as one of the seven nations in the world not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Israel, Myanmar, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan are also not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The international community’s response to the chemical weapons use was determined by the lack of legal precedent. Syria cannot violate a treaty it has not agreed to. Despite strict legal standing, the international community determined that the chemical weapons attack could not go unanswered. In response, the international community forced Syria to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and adhere to its provisions.
This plan also prescribed the forfeiture of Syria’s chemical weapons to the OPCW for them to destroy, something never before undertaken. In all other cases, states have been responsible for their own stockpile destruction, and the OPCW has been responsible for tracking each state’s progress. The Chemical Weapons Convention set a timeline for destruction of stockpiles: all stockpiles were to be destroyed by April 2007, with no deadline extensions past April 2012. Of the eight states in the OPCW with declared chemical weapons stockpiles, only three (Albania, South Korea, India) have met either deadline, and the completion dates for the other states range from 2015 (Russia) to 2023 (United States).
Syria is a complicated battleground on which to assess the success or failure of the OPCW. For one, the OPCW is a newcomer, entering Syria in an actionable capacity only ten days ago. Syria has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, so failure to address Syria’s chemical weapons cannot reasonably fall on the OPCW itself, even if responsibility does fall on those nations that compose it. However, it would be a far reach to herald the OPCW’s success. The OPCW issued the formal report on 16 September, confirming chemical weapons use, but the inspectors do not have the mandate to assign blame for the attacks. The report had little impact on the matter, as it was issued days after Syria declared intent to relinquish all chemical weapons. It largely served to confirm the assertions of the United States. To better assess the OPCW, it would be better to assess the Chemical Weapons Convention concerning its states parties, and see if the OPCW is able to succeed given its current capacities.
Libya ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on June 1, 2004, during the reign of Muammar Gadhafi. Upon accession, Libya declared 24.7 metric tons of sulfur mustard, 1,390 metric tons of precursor chemicals, 3,563 unloaded chemical munitions, and three production facilities. The Libyan Revolution erupted on February 15, 2011, and over the next eight months the nation was embroiled in a lengthy and deadly civil conflict. In November 2011 and February 2012 the National Transitional Council (NTC)’s government declared previously undisclosed chemical weapons to the OPCW. This stockpile contained several hundred loaded sulfur mustard munitions, a few hundred kilograms of sulfur mustard, and a number of other munitions components. Since Libya’s initial declaration, the total metric tonnage of declared sulfur mustard has risen to 26.3 metric tons, a sharp increase from the original 24.7 metric tons reported in 2004.
The events regarding chemical weapons disarmament in Libya are disconcerting. Libya under Gadhafi was able to conceal chemical weapons stockpiles, and the OPCW never discovered this. Simultaneously, the international community was silent on the matter, either from the lack of knowledge or lack of impetus to share knowledge. The international community has clearly agreed to make states ratify and follow the convention in response to chemical weapons use. If the OPCW and Chemical Weapons Convention are unable to hold the states parties to the provisions, as they have failed in Libya, then the future success of the OPCW must be viewed with strict scrutiny. The Chemical Weapons Convention is flawed, and the OPCW could seem to succeed while truly failing to eliminate chemical weapons.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is unique in that it has concrete and actionable verification procedures. Article IX of the Convention provides for challenge inspections, in which any party of the Chemical Weapons Convention can challenge any other member’s compliance with the convention. Only upon a three-quarter-majority vote of the OPCW’s Executive Council can this challenge be overridden, and the state under inspection must comply fully. The full process of challenging a state’s compliance is a long process, requiring the exhaustion of all diplomatic options, numerous rounds of verification, and several rounds of proposed sanctions if still noncompliant. However, it is intended for grave situations of noncompliance with the convention, so such a challenge merits such a weighty process. This provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention has never been enacted.
This award of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons must be seen as a hopeful prognostication. It alludes strongly to Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize in 2009: a similar promise of things yet to come, but not demonstrated at the time of the award. Many questions remain that will deeply affect the OPCW’s success, including many questions about its ability to succeed given both the limitations of the OPCW’s role and the past failings of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW is in the midst of a transformation. Its role in confronting Syria was a key step in the disarmament process, yet its role in Syria going forward is limited to the disarmament of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles. The OPCW is at a crossroads that could lead to nearly diametric roles; it can emerge a major advocate in the fight to eliminate chemical weapons, or recede into the chemical weapons disarmament brigade of the United Nations. The 2013 Nobel Peace Prize must not enable the international community to turn a blind eye to the major issues of the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Instead, it should embolden the international community to fix those issues and answer the proclamation given to the OPCW in Stockholm today.
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