While the Iranian nuclear deal doesn’t completely resolve the issue by any means, the agreement makes significant progress on one of the most pressing international security concerns. The time needed for the Islamic Republic to physically produce a nuclear warhead will be significantly lengthened, essentially making Netanyahu’s infamous red line inapplicable. In addition, diplomatic structures are now in place for a permanent solution to be reached in the near future.
The deal’s specifications deter Iran’s nuclear capability beyond what had been even the most optimistic predictions. Specifically, Iran will no longer be able to enrich uranium past five percent. The stockpile of uranium enriched past this level will be destroyed or reconverted to a level more suitable for civilian use. In addition, about half of the country’s centrifuges will be shut down, and the construction of new centrifuges will be halted. To monitor the agreement, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is afforded intrusive daily inspections as well as 24-hour video surveillance.
Since the Iranian Revolution over 34 years ago, the United States and Iran haven’t been able to reach a single diplomatic agreement. Now, even if a permanent solution isn’t achieved, diplomacy with Iran can be seen as more than just rhetorical jockeying. The potential benefits from a modest diplomatic relationship have the potential to shake up the Middle East; because of Iran’s geopolitical prominence, such an arrangement could very likely be used to negotiate agreements with Hezbollah, the Al-Assad regime in Syria, and even the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Furthermore, an extremely favorable precedent has been established for dealing with the relatively obstinate regime. The international community, including the United States, did not give up much leverage during the negotiations. Over the next six months, approximately $7 billion of sanctions will be lifted in a “limited, temporary, reversible” way. The most damaging and effective sanctions on the finance and oil industries remain unchanged until a long-term agreement is reached.
This recent change of heart in Iran seems to be a confirming case for the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions in foreign policy. The United States started using varying degrees of economic sanctions after the Revolution in 1979, but has only begun to strengthen the sanctions in the last decade. The world community has followed suit, with the European Union choosing to embargo Iranian oil exports last summer. The Europeans have also blocked the global clearing system used by Iranian banks to clear financial transactions, effectively halting all Iranian trade with the West. These sanctions seem to be achieving their designed effect, as economic growth is nonexistent and inflation has reached 40 percent over the last year.
The measurable effect of the sanctions, combined with the other external economic factors, is prompting an inevitable shift in Iranian politics. The shale gas revolution in the United States and increased gas exports from competing countries in the region are decreasing demand for Iranian oil exports. The stagnant Iranian economy has been particularly difficult for the middle class, leading its members to demand economic reforms. President Rouhani was elected on a moderate ticket last year on the promise of improving the economy, and repealing international sanctions would be a promising step in that direction. In this way, both Mr. Rouhani and the Iranian public feel pressure to cut back on nuclear capabilities.
The final, and perhaps most significant precedent of the negotiations is the failure to acknowledge a “right to enrich uranium”. The so-called right is extremely controversial, and the fact that the West sidestepped mentioning it can itself be considered a victory.
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