November 24, 2014: Kurdish Peshmerga loyal to the Kurdish Democratic Party advance upon ISIS militants lying in wait in Kharabarut, Iraq. They manage to take the city—temporarily. The KDP forces soon face an aggressive ISIS counterattack and decide to retreat to avoid any losses. Meanwhile, a nearby unit of Kurdish fighters loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan blindly prepares to advance on Kharabarut themselves, unaware of the amassed ISIS fighters. The lack of communication and coordination results in the death of at least 11 Kurdish fighters. This scene presents a critical question: why were the Peshmerga forces disorganized and disconnected?
The Peshmerga—literally “those who face death”—are the Kurdish fighting forces based in Syria and Iraq, and are widely regarded as the most effective force currently fighting ISIS. Kurdish forces in Iraq have managed to reclaim key cities such as Kirkuk without the help of the Shiite Iraqi Army forces, and Syrian Kurds famously withstood the six-month siege of Kobane last fall. But the Peshmerga have claimed these victories in spite of the absence of a proper state, organizational troubles, funding and arms shortcomings, and lack of coordinated support from outside their organization. Furthermore, the Peshmerga have managed their accomplishments even as a political rift threatens to prevent them from reaching their full potential in the fight against ISIS.
Peering Into History
Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous region of northern Iraq that emerged as a de facto state after the Gulf War. The region has two major political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which have long been at odds with each other. Famed Kurdish politician Mustafa Barzani founded the KDP in 1946, and Jalal Talabani subsequently led the PUK to split off of the KDP in the mid-70s due to political and ideological differences—the PUK had a more left-leaning, social democratic ideology, while the KDP retained its conservative and tribal political philosophy. The two parties enjoyed roughly equal support well into the mid-90s, when they fell into conflict.
The Iraqi Kurdish Civil War began in 1994 after international support split; Iran supplied weapons to the PUK, while Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces eventually aided the KDP. The conflict ended in 1998 when KDP and PUK leaders Masoud Barzani (the KDP founder’s son) and Jalal Talabani signed a Washington-mediated peace deal. The agreement ensured that the parties would, moving forwards, share political power and revenues garnered from across the region. However, the longstanding legacy of the interparty conflict continues to divide Kurdish society between the KDP-dominated region, centered around Erbil, and the PUK area, including its capital, Sulaymaniyah.
Today, Kurdistan is governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a parliamentary government which includes elected officials from both the KDP and PUK. While the KRG’s parliament passes legislation, it is up to the independent bureaucracies of the PUK and KDP to enforce that legislation and govern in their respective regions.
The HPR was granted an interview with Captain Nyazi Abdulwahid, a commander of a Peshmerga battalion in Altun Kupri, a town north of Kirkuk. He explained that the administrative split has military ramifications: rather than being loyal to the KRG, most Peshmerga “belong to one of the two parties, the PUK or the KDP.” Thus, the military remains largely divided and loyal to separate parties despite the unity of the Kurdish government and the emerging unification of its forces.
Differing Opinions
The effects of the military split have been disputed. While some Kurds feel that the administrative split allows for more effective fighting against ISIS, others believe it instead sows disunity. In a January interview with Al-Monitor, PUK party member Omar Mohsen commented, “The best thing that could happen to the Kurds is if the PUK and KDP Peshmerga united. Peshmerga are the soul of Kurdistan.”
Indeed, Michael Knights, a Washington Institute fellow who specializes in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states, also sees the military split as a complication in the fight against ISIS. In an interview with the HPR, Knights detailed several disadvantages faced by the Peshmerga, noting that the split military results in unequal distribution of equipment: “First of all … you have some very well equipped units, the Praetorian party elite units, and you have some very under-equipped units. There’s probably not optimal distribution of equipment across the units.” He elaborated that this is particularly troublesome when facing a highly mobile enemy like ISIS, which can choose to exploit weak points across the long front line.
Furthermore, the split can contribute to disunity among the Peshmerga at a time when they would benefit from nationalist, rather than sectionalist, pride. “When something goes wrong, the Kurds tend to start blaming each other on party political lines,” Knights explained. “If the KDP suffer problems around Sinjar or Mosul, some PUK will begin to criticize them, and vice versa. You’ll see that the national solidarity that you want to have is not there.”
Divided They Stand?
Nevertheless, despite the political tension between the Peshmerga forces, Abdulwahid offered a different opinion on the situation. He explained that because the Peshmerga forces are essentially autonomous, there are few mishaps and negative side effects. “We PUK Peshmergas fight in the areas administered by our party, close to the areas of Erbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. The KDP Peshmergas fight ISIS in an area from Erbil to Zakho. That is why there is no problem in reality on the ground.”
The military victories of the Peshmerga seem to provide support for the captain’s argument, and Knights also noted certain advantages enjoyed by the split Peshmerga forces. Party loyalties among Peshmerga fighters create strong military bonds that cannot be matched by forces in the Iraqi military, Knights said. The distinct fighting forces develop “military traditions, myths, famous units, famous commanders, and a certain way of dressing and speaking to each other … things you can’t make overnight.” Knights explained that these differences lend to the effectiveness of the divided Peshmerga—distinct cultures inspire military pride and prowess.
Thanks to their effective military mores as well as party-based funding, the Peshmerga are “amongst some of the more professional and elite forces in the region.” They enjoy an extremely fast rate of mobilization when compared to traditional Iraqi forces. “If the party says, ‘Everybody come to the front,’ it will happen very quickly,” Knights stated. Peshmerga fighters temporarily released to civilian life stay in cities near the battlefront, enabling recalled forces to mobilize in hours. In contrast, Iraqi units often face the problem of soldiers rotated hundreds of miles away from their bases, resulting in a delay of up to several days during mobilization.
Moreover, the Iraqi forces face the financially draining issue of ghost soldiers, men who are listed on the payroll but do not fight, choosing instead to split the false paycheck with their corrupt commanders. This further strains the effectiveness of their units, and highlights the positive effects of the Peshmerga’s split—fighters who are incentivized to professionalism by their political loyalty.
Foreign Perceptions
While opinions from within Kurdistan vary on the functional split within its military force, the division has prevented the Peshmerga from receiving potential international support. In 2009, American general Ray Odierno attempted to offer training and aid to the Peshmerga. But according to reports by Al-Monitor, when he met with Kurdish leadership, Odierno explained, “Funds have been put aside by Congress to prepare, train and arm the [Peshmerga] force … but I can’t give it to two separate Peshmerga forces … unless they are unified.”
These comments were corroborated by the Bayan Center, a Baghdad-based think tank. The group reported on Odierno’s meeting with the Kurds: “[T]he Americans wanted to create a unified and professional force that was non-political, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party officials missed out on the opportunity.” American training and support for the Kurdish military never materialized.
Even as the Peshmerga take on ISIS, the political rift is still hampering foreign aid efforts. Abdulwahid agreed, saying,“They trust us less in a time when we need assistance more than anything else.” His comments ring particularly true at a time when the divided Kurdish forces struggle to gain direct foreign support despite the continued ISIS onslaught. As recently as June 29, the U.S. Congress voted against directly arming the Peshmerga. This was in part due to fears of stoking Kurdish nationalism in a divided region, but also because of the Americans’ standing policy to only send aid to internationally recognized states. However, with the Peshmerga effort so crucial to hopes of degrading ISIS, foreign countries may have to decide if delivering aid is vital enough for internal divisions to be overlooked.
“There’s coming a moment when countries of external aid will have to decide: do we keep providing aid in absence of security sector reform, or should we make it conditional?” pondered Knights. If the United States and other western powers stop providing aid, it’s possible that the Peshmerga might simply look to other allies for assistance, thus decreasing western influence in the region.
A Kurdish Future
As the Peshmerga continue their fight against ISIS, the issue of their divided nature has come to the attention of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Last August, the Kurdish parliament passed a resolution decreeing that the Peshmerga become a united, apolitical force. However, despite a six-month deadline outlined by the parliament, 10 months have passed without serious strides toward unification.
Unification of all Peshmerga forces would allow for coordination between fighter units, increased nationalist rather than sectionalist pride, and a greater move toward a more unified Kurdistan. Furthermore, the creation of a professional armed force loyal only to the central government would lessen the possibility of future inter-Kurdish conflicts. However, these benefits could only be fully realized if the new, unified forces were as professionalized and efficient as the current, divided forces, which benefit from party loyalties, funding, and a distinct military culture.
Daunting administrative hurdles remain to be cleared for the successful unification of the Peshmerga. In the meantime, Abdulwahid remains realistic but upbeat: “We will be loyal to the political decisions of the leaders of our parties. However, we believe that the decisions are made by the two party leaderships collectively and we are hoping that in the future the differences between the two diminish and we have one united Peshmerga force.”
Image Credits: Enno Lenze/Wikimedia Commons, Indra Di Rossche/Wikimedia Commons
Update (11/25/15): This article has been updated to reflect edits made in the print edition of the HPR.
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