How the Taliban Came Back

And what it may mean for the U.S. strategic dilemma
With fraud-ridden elections, a growing insurgency, and expanding Taliban influence, Afghanistan is at its most critical crossroads since the overthrow of the fundamentalist regime eight years ago. A report leaked last month revealed that Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, has requested 40,000 troops to supplement the 68,000 already committed to an intensive counterinsurgency strategy.
But many critics of the war, such as Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, argue that there is a much less costly way to achieve America’s interest in preventing a terrorist attack.
“With a counterterrorism approach, rather than occupying Afghanistan with troops and attempting to transform it, we can maintain surveillance to watch for evidence of al-Qaida activity and then use force to suppress that presence,” Bacevich said in an interview with the HPR. This approach would entail the use of cruise missiles, Predator drones, special forces, and bribery of warlords. Yet in light of the conditions that have sustained the Taliban’s rise, the “counterterrorism approach” may not be as simple or effective as it sounds. The Taliban, who remain sympathetic to al-Qaida, have expanded their influence by providing order and security in the absence of strong local governance and co-opting much of Afghanistan’s vast opium economy.
A Shadow Government
The shortarm of the government in Kabul has left many Afghans without basic security and rule of law, leading them to accept Taliban authority in exchange for protection. Nazir Shahrani, professor of Middle Eastern studies at Indiana University, told the HPR, “The international community promised the Afghani people democracy, but instead they have gotten a kleptocracy—a group of thieves who are fixated on bribery.” The Taliban, meanwhile, have become the de facto figures of authority in many local areas.
Under the inattentive administration of current President Hamid Karzai, tribal disputes over land and other resources have festered. This has created opportunities for the Taliban to exploit tribal rivalries and assert themselves as mediators or dispensers of justice. The Taliban have proven especially adept at playing on the discontent of some Pashtun tribes who feel marginalized by the current government.
The Taliban are also able to provide much-needed safety from local bandits and criminals in many areas. By ensuring basic security, the Taliban have persuaded many Afghans that they are a viable alternative to the unresponsive central government.
Warlords and Drug Lords
The Taliban have further extended their influence through the protection of poppy, part of a lucrative drug economy that represents almost half of the country’s annual GDP. This control has furnished the Taliban with hundreds of millions of dollars that it can pour into the insurgency.
The government’s attempts to rein in production by destroying poppy fields, however, have only cemented the bonds between the Taliban and local tribes who rely on the crop to meet their needs. Vanda Felbab-Brown, fellow on foreign policy and defense initiatives at the Brookings Institution, told the HPR, “When poppy is suppressed, the daily life of local farmers is greatly impacted because this provides the money they live on. By protecting poppy fields, the Taliban give immediate material benefits to the rural population.”
In Nangarhar, for instance, a province that traditionally has been antagonistic to the Taliban, new eradication policies drove tribes seeking to protect their livelihood into a relationship with the extremists. A counterterrorism approach may not be able to dissolve the ties between the Taliban and the rural population if it does not reduce dependence on Taliban safeguards for sustenance. An effective counternarcotics program, within a broader counterinsurgency strategy, would likely need to focus on interdiction and rural development to strengthen the licit economy.
Strategic Costs and Consequences
As the Obama administration weighs its options, it will have to assess the different short- and long-term consequences of each approach. With a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy of the kind proposed by McChrystal, counterterrorism tactics would be subservient to long-term objectives of providing security and strengthening the Afghani government. Counterinsurgency is expensive at a time when the war is increasingly unpopular, but unless the “counterterrorism approach” can address fundamental issues such as governance in local areas, it may not prevent a relapse to the pre-9/11 era of Taliban strongholds and terrorist safe havens. An approach based on limited strikes, though politically attractive in the short run, would risk targeting only the most visible symptoms of the underlying problems in Afghanistan.