Gazprom and the Grexit: A Growing Headache for Europe

In 1976, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis confidently declared that “Greece belongs to the West,” echoing the sentiments of the Greek political elite since the end of the Second World War. The nation is the birthplace of democracy, land of the great thinkers that inspired the founders of Western democracies millennia after their deaths. The West claims Greece as its ideological homeland. Despite the country’s so-called “Western” heritage, however, Greece has consistently straddled the line between East and West since its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. As an Eastern Orthodox nation and a former Ottoman territory, Greece shares strong ties with the East and the recent crisis in the region has brought to the forefront Greece’s complicated identity. Amidst the country’s debt crisis and rising tensions between Russia and the West, European energy politics has brought Greece to the forefront of the European Union’s desire to shed its dependence on Russian energy imports. With significant resource potential, Greece is suspended between European powers and Russia as a key player in the future of the EU’s energy independence.
As the Greek government teeters on the brink of bankruptcy and Germany remains stalwart in its austerity policy, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has been searching for lenders whose assistance would not entail stipulations akin to those from the Eurozone. At the moment, Russia appears to be a popular choice, especially considering its historical relationship with Greece. Shortly after Syriza took power in the January snap election, finance minister Anton Siluanov said that Russia would consider lending to Greece if asked. A statement in early February from the office of the Prime Minister Tsipras explicitly indicated that the two nations would pursue a stronger relationship after a phone call between him and Putin, reading, “The Russian president and the prime minister emphasized the need for substantial improvement of the cooperation between Greece and Russia—countries with deep and historic ties—especially in the sectors of economy, energy, tourism, culture and transport.” Despite the recent fall of the ruble, the Kremlin appears willing to lend to Greece should negotiations with the Eurozone fall through. In becoming a creditor to Greece, the Kremlin would enjoy a much larger sway over the politics and especially the foreign policy of the European Union. Recent moves to forge a stronger bond with Greece seem to comprise a larger plan to consolidate Russian power and to have a better means of resisting European sanctions due to Russian involvement in Crimea. Greece’s energy potential is of particular interest to the Kremlin as a way to increase Europe’s reliance on Russian energy exports and thus counter European incentives for the sanctions.
The Specter of Russian Energy
Perhaps the most troubling outcome of Greece potentially leaving the EU and a stronger Greco-Russian alliance is the possibility of Russian control over Greek natural gas and energy infrastructure, which could severely harm prospects of European energy independence. As of September 2014, Germany imports about $30.9 billion of Russian oil annually, about 30 percent of its total energy imports. Russian oil comprises anywhere from 70-90 percent of some smaller EU members’ oil imports, especially in former Soviet satellite states. European reliance on Russian oil has presented itself as a large bargaining chip in the hands of the Kremlin—when the United States and the EU imposed sanctions upon Russia in response to its action in Crimea and Ukraine, many experts speculated that Russia would retaliate by cutting down on exports to the European Union to damage its sluggish economy. Russia’s power as an oil and gas exporter depends upon Europe’s lack of diverse energy resources, and Greece could be the country to allow for diversification.
Greece is currently poised to be a key figure in the diversification of European energy imports. One of the largest new sources of energy for the EU is the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and Greece is set to contain its longest portion. The pipeline is one of three currently under construction in southern Europe and Turkey and it will play a major role in the future of European energy independence. Daniel Speckhard, former U.S. Ambassador to Greece, stated in an interview with the HPR, “Greece has a great interest [in the TAP] because it can get a lot of revenue from the pipeline, and it wants to see itself as an important country and energy hub in Europe.” The TAP would route Azerbaijani natural gas into southern Italy, allowing access to many more energy markets across the continent and throughout the European Union. Sourcing Azerbaijani natural gas would also bypass Russian energy exports, allowing for a greater degree of freedom from Russian pressure in the EU. Were diversification to succeed, Putin would have significantly less leverage to stymie Western sanctions.

Greek cooperation is vital to the project and could determine the degree to which Europe would suffer if Russia chooses to reduce oil exports in the future, a possibility not all that unlikely should conflict in Ukraine continue. Yet, a closer relationship between Russia and Greece in the possibility of a Grexit could ultimately foil Europe’s aspirations for more diverse energy imports. In 2013, Antonis Samaras’s attempt to sell state-owned gas firm Depa to Gazprom fell through due to pressures from the West, halting the promise of €900 million in Greek funds. However, a potential renewed deal between Depa and Gazprom in the case of a Grexit has resurfaced in light of Greek energy minister Panagiotis Lafazanis’s planned meeting with Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller. A potential Depa buyout would eliminate hopes of reduced reliance on Russian energy with the TAP and would ultimately strengthen the hold Russia has on Europe’s energy market. Russian presence in Greek energy would also provide a means for Putin to influence the foreign policy of the European Union to his advantage. Speckhard said that, “Infrastructure assets are national security assets in many ways. If you control the energy assets of a country you have a lot of leverage on the country as well. Western countries are worried about Russia buying up energy assets because it could use this leverage with Greece to influence foreign policy in the European Union.” In holding the energy infrastructure of Greece, Putin could more easily sway Tsipras to vote in the interests of Russia.
Greece in the Balance
That Greece controls the future of the TAP and Europe’s reliance upon Russian energy should be of great importance to its creditors and to Europe at large. Greece has the power to determine whether Europe will be free of Russia’s energy control and if Tsipras does indeed seek Russian assistance, Europe could easily lose the promise of Greece’s energy infrastructure. The indebted nation, however, has been unable to leverage this asset in negotiations with the European Union due to Europe’s failure to see the Grexit as an increasingly likely possibility. Speckhard noted, “I am nervous that Europe until very recently, hasn’t been paying attention to the strategic issues at stake with the Grexit. Recently, statements coming out of Berlin have suggested that there is a greater recognition of the potential costs of a Greek exit, but I’m still concerned that the strategic and foreign policy consequences of an exit are not fully understood and fully appreciated.” European leaders have not fully realized that the Grexit would be a devastating outcome of the nation’s economic crisis. Not only would Europe lose ground with Russia, but it could open itself up to economic instability should Russia control even more of its energy resources and infrastructure. As the Grexit comes closer to reality, the EU cannot dismiss Greece’s increasingly close relationship with Moscow as meaningless—it is anything but that.
Greece will play a key role in the growing tension between East and West, but the nation’s future on either side of the conflict is unsure. If Moscow hopes to consolidate additional power, a Grexit would certainly provide the leverage it wants in “containing” the West and attaining its goals in Ukraine, but Greece would suffer an even greater loss of agency should Russia exert new control over its economy and its infrastructure. Should Greece remain within the Eurozone, Europe would maintain a key component of its plan for energy independence and decrease the influence of Russian oil. However, if that is the result of the EU providing another bailout, Greece may be forced into more compliance with its directives and lose its bargaining power of the TAP, as thus far, Greece has been unable to use the TAP to force a reduction of austerity measures. The country is poised to be drawn into the midst of this clash between Russia and the West, and Greece stands to lose itself to either side. Unless Greece sells itself as the vital player in the European Union that it truly is, the West may find itself under pressure from greater Russian influence.
Image Credits: Featured Image/Wikimedia/Taroth, Putin and Tsipras/Wikimedia/www.kremlin.ru, TAP/Wikimedia/Genti77