What does it mean to disapprove of something on moral principle? Do any and all prejudices, fears, dislikes, and rationalizations count as moral beliefs? Or, as I am more inclined to believe, does society regard moral convictions as something much more particular than any run-of-the-mill feeling?
In his essay, “Lord Delvin and The Enforcement of Morals,” the famed jurisprudential philosopher Ronald Dworkin argues that not all beliefs count as moral convictions. Relying on many of Dworkin’s arguments, my purpose in this article is to extend his reasoning to the question of whether anti-gay stances count as moral positions.
The question is important because society is more likely to respect opinions that stem from serious moral sentiments than we are opinions clearly rooted in irrational prejudices. For example, society generally accords a measure of respect to pro-life individuals who, sincerely believing that life begins at conception, advocate a complete ban on abortions. But society generally scoffs at individuals who, believing women are fit only for housework and pregnancy, would ban all abortions on this account. In the first instance, although we may disagree, we extend our respect because we sense a genuine moral conviction. In the latter we give only our ire because we recognize an intolerable misogyny.
In order to have a moral position of any sort, then, I must produce reasons for it—to suggest otherwise would be to argue that moral beliefs can be arbitrarily derived. If that were the case, nothing would prevent me from arguing, say, that sleeping is immoral. But one needs not only reasons, but legitimate reasons. That is to say, not all justifications count as the kinds of reasons that can uphold a moral claim. Ronald Dworkin lists the following kinds of reasons as insufficient for substantiating a moral position:
(i) Reasons that are prejudicial or, in Dworkin’s words, “postures of judgment that take into account considerations our conventions exclude”: Ex. “I believe homosexuals are morally inferior because ‘real men’ don’t sexually desire other men.” This statement is a prejudice rather than a moral belief because it automatically labels persons with a particular immutable characteristic as morally inferior. Conventionally, Dworkin writes, “a man whose judgments about Jews, or Negroes, or Southerners, or women, or effeminate men are based on his belief that any member of these classes automatically deserves less respect, without regard to anything he himself has done, is said to be prejudiced against that group.”
(ii) Reasons that are purely emotional reactions: Ex. “Homosexuals are morally inferior because the idea of two men having sex makes me sick.” Here, Dworkin does not mean to say that moral positions must be dispassionately held, but only that they are supposed to justify emotional reactions, not vice versa. The idea is that one must supply legitimate reasons, independent of an intense emotional reaction, to prove one’s view is a moral conviction. Without these independent reasons, one is merely expressing a phobia or an obsession, not a moral view. For instance, if my only reason for disliking spiders is that their presence triggers in me an intense emotional reaction, I probably have a phobia of spiders.
(iii) Reasons that are obvious falsehoods: Most people expressing anti-gay views implicitly acknowledge points (i) & (ii)—they understand they cannot base their beliefs on aversions and prejudices alone if they genuinely wish to present a moral claim. With scant evidentiary support, they then try to bolster the moral worth of their views by making a slew of empirical and causal claims. Ex: Gays are morally inferior because, take your pick, they are responsible for HIV/AIDS, they are mostly pedophiles, they engage in physically debilitating acts, they are responsible for the death of marriage, they are responsible for 9/11, and they threaten the very existence of society. These kinds of claims, Dworkin writes, are not only false, “but are so implausible that they challeng[e] the minimal standards of evidence [speakers] generally accept and impose on others.” Such blatant rationalization of prejudice is something distinct from a moral position.
(iv) Reasons that merely state that the belief is generally shared: Ex: “Homosexuality is immoral because everyone I know thinks so.” In truth, this is not actually a reason since it does not argue in any way for the legitimacy of the claim. “With the possible (though complex) exception of a deity,” writes Dworkin, “there is no moral authority to which I can appeal and so automatically make my position a moral one. I must have my own reasons though of course I may have been taught these reasons by others.”
In Dworkin’s final analysis, then, a belief cannot appeal to arbitrary reasons if it wishes to attain the status of a moral position. Rather, one must adduce some kind of general theory in order to support the moral worth of a given claim. To establish one’s anti-gay stances as a moral belief, for example, one may offer as a reason the fact that the Bible seems to condemn homosexuality. This justification is not disqualified by the arbitrary reasons outlined above, and it may very well constitute the kind of legitimate explanation that is the stuff of moral stances.
However, appealing to scripture alone cannot secure the moral worth of a claim. If a person attempts to justify his condemnation of homosexuality by pointing to the Bible, one may still question his sincerity and his consistency. If the speaker has never read the Bible, rarely goes to church, and in fact doesn’t generally believe scripture is morally binding, we may take into account this insincerity and strip his anti-gay stance of its moral pretense. Moreover, if the speaker believes homosexuality is immoral, but is unwilling to admit this of other acts condemned in the Bible, we may well question this inconsistency. If this inconsistency cannot be explained by some neutral principle, it is obvious that the speaker is merely masking a prejudice under the guise of a moral conviction.
Only when a belief can appeal to some general theory or principle, sincerely and consistently applied, can it achieve the status of a moral position. To the extent that anti-gay stances have difficulty meeting this bar, one may very well wonder whether they classify as moral convictions in the first place. It is clear that many times, homophobia is nothing more than an invidious prejudice—something altogether distinct from a moral belief.
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