Iraq isn’t South Vietnam, but some of the same dynamics are driving U.S. policy
A relentless enemy, thought vanquished, returns with a devastating offensive. An American-trained security force splinters and collapses with embarrassing swiftness. The threatened government pleads for U.S. intervention to save the day.
This was South Vietnam, April of 1975. After a whirlwind offensive starting at the beginning of the year, North Vietnamese forces stood poised to advance on Saigon, the South’s capital. With the threat of South Vietnam’s utter collapse, President Ford requested that Congress authorize over a billion dollars of military and civil aid to the beleaguered South Vietnamese. During the North’s Easter Offensive of 1972, American air power had helped Southern troops hold back the communist advance. This time, the nation, weary of the polarizing and frustrating conflict, did not go along with the request for further military aid. On April 30, 1975, with the last South Vietnamese army units defeated, Saigon fell to the Northern army, ending the existence of South Vietnam.
Today, Iraq seems to face a similar fate. The Al-Qaeda inspired fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi earlier this year, and on June 11 took control of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi security forces sent to defend the area were routed, and they retreated south towards Baghdad. The militant forces also advanced south, seizing towns like Tikrit, home of former dictator Saddam Hussein, and as of this writing stand poised less than 70 miles from Baghdad. Calls for American intervention to prop up the beleaguered Iraqi government are mounting.
Iraq is not Vietnam. The Shiite defenders of Baghdad and other Southern cities have a significant incentive to hold their positions, unlike the generally conscripted South Vietnamese troops. And ISIS is nowhere near the fighting ability and conventional power of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). However, the dynamics shaping American policy towards Iraq today in many ways mirror the thinking at the end of the Vietnam War, offering lessons for American policy as the ISIS onslaught continues.
Southern Strategy
In 1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords, officially ending the American combat role in Vietnam. The war had been massively divisive at home, with battles in American streets between demonstrators in favor of and opposed to the conflict. Facing continued domestic unrest, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor-cum-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had sought a means to extricate the country from the Vietnam quagmire, and with the Paris Peace Accords they seemed to have found their answer.
The accords reaffirmed the independence of South Vietnam and created several changes to the government, making it more acceptable to Communist guerilla fighters. At the same time, the North agreed to halt the war, with the threat of an American return in the event that the agreement was not honored. Privately, Kissinger acknowledged that the North would probably not abandon its quest for reunification, and that the agreement was most likely to buy the United States a “decent interval” between its withdrawal and the inevitable collapse of the Saigon government.
When the northern invasion began in late 1974 and accelerated in the beginning of 1975, the Southern forces proved incredibly inadequate, despite years of American training and the latest military equipment. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Southern military, was unable to stop the advance, and steadily fell back. While it was speculated by analysts that major airstrikes against North Vietnam could check their advance, Congress had prohibited any further military action in Indochina in 1974. The only use of American airpower was to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese from the country as it fell to Communist forces.
Mesopotamian Miseries
Today, President Obama seems to be facing the same perfect storm that confronted Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford in the 1970s. The American people have expressed in poll after poll their disillusionment with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are generally very cautious of reengaging in anything similar, as the massive public opposition to intervention in the Syrian Civil War demonstrated. While Congressional opposition to intervening to bolster the Iraqi government is not as pronounced and visceral as that which faced Ford, the majority of Congress still seems to be unwilling to back a new chapter in the Iraq War.
Despite the clear domestic opposition, the fact remains that an American ally and client appears to be crumbling. Large numbers of Iraq’s security forces abandoned their posts and retreated in an embarrassing rout at the hands of a significantly smaller number of ISIS fighters. Retreating units have left equipment and weapons, much of it from the United States, enhancing ISIS’s abilities to continue its rampage. Iraq is not in as bad a state as South Vietnam, but the situation is very fluid, and a possible siege of Baghdad is not out of the question. Additionally, ISIS is clearly interested in continuing to engage in terrorist activities beyond Iraq, having a very strong base in Syria, where it continues to be involved, and training numerous foreign fighters, one of which appears to have committed a shooting in Belgium several weeks ago. As in the case of Vietnam, the United States faces the quandary of choosing between perceived strategic interest and domestic public opinion.
The Missing Link
Clearly, there are crucial differences between the fall of South Vietnam and the ISIS threat in Iraq. As noted, it is unlikely, at least thus far, that Baghdad and major urban centers of the south of Iraq will fall to ISIS militants. The Shiite population in the South knows only too well what they can expect from the Sunni extremists who make up ISIS, and so will not simply allow ISIS to overrun them. Additionally, Iran has recently indicated that it is sending some support to prop up the central government in Iraq. Furthermore, ISIS, while quite formidable and motivated, does not possess the conventional capabilities that allowed the PAVN, at that point one of the largest armies in the world, to overrun South Vietnam.
However, one difference stands out that should bear the greatest on American policymaking. The North Vietnamese did not have any interest in continuing a struggle against the United States after defeating the South. Reunification and a struggle for independence had been the entire rationale for the Northern war effort, and with this victory they did not seek to continue to confront the United States any further. Unlike the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, ISIS presents a much broader threat to American interests. The group is interested in establishing a new Islamic caliphate under strict Islamic law across the Middle East, threatening American allies beyond the Iraqi government, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Its Middle Eastern rampage also presents a threat to global energy supplies, as it has seized multiple oil production and refinement facilities, and if it advances further into Southern Iraq, it will threaten even more oil wells and supplies. Finally, ISIS has created a massive, lawless region where other jihadists can train and equip for further attacks outside of the region, directed at places like Kashmir, Chechnya, and the West in general. ISIS also attracts foreign fighters from the West who are being radicalized and trained by their involvement in ISIS, making them critical threats to Western nations on their return.
Considering the massive threat posed by ISIS to the region and the United States, some American action is demanded. In the short term, the US can speed up the delivery of crucial weapons systems like fighter jets and attack helicopters that can target insurgent forces on the ground. If the situation becomes especially dire, and Baghdad faces the imminent threat of siege or collapse, American airstrikes can help check the continued advance of the militants. Given their expanding membership and need to traverse large distances, ISIS is needing to operate in a more conventional manner and move in larger, motorized units, making it uniquely vulnerable among terrorist groups to being interdicted by airpower, in much the same way that bombing the conventional forces of North Vietnam in 1972 helped halt their advance during the Easter Offensive. Stopgap measures like these will give some breathing room to the Baghdad government, preventing its complete disintegration and checking the ISIS onslaught.
These measures are, however, only temporary fixes. As was the case of South Vietnam, the root problem in Iraq is political, and not military. A major driver of unrest is the decision by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to exclude Sunni Muslims from the government and effectively seek to advance sectarian Shiite interests at the expense of the Sunnis. This has contributed to the splintering of the country along sectarian lines and has alienated a significant portion of the Iraqi population, leading them to be significantly more sympathetic, and in many cases supportive, of the ISIS fighters. Unless vital reforms are undertaken within the Iraqi government that make it more inclusive of all Iraqis, then, as with South Vietnam, the best the United States can hope for, no matter the firepower, blood, and treasure expended, is a decent interval between an American disengagement and Iraqi chaos.
Image credits: BBC, The Telegraph.
