The Curious Case of Singaporean Success

This past September, Singaporean politicians made history by contesting the nation’s premier political authority (the People’s Action Party) in all 89 parliamentary districts. At first glance, this opposition to the country’s foremost ruling party since 1954 suggests a transition in popular opinion away from traditional authoritative constructs and towards more modern democratic ones. However, the results speak for themselves: of those 89 districts, 83 were claimed by the PAP. Despite a nearly perfect voter turnout (approximately 90 percent), no democratic revolution occurred; in fact, the PAP even regained three seats in the Parliament from its democratic counterparts. Adding to this election’s monumentality, Singapore’s exponential economic growth has begun to slow down in recent years (decreasing from four to two percent this year alone)—a process that usually prompts political change. The nation’s complete lack of reactionary measures to this economic deceleration suggests to many that Singapore is some sort of unrecognized enigma.
To explain this uniqueness, many social scientists juxtapose Singapore’s present state with the favorite precedents of modern Asian democratic power—Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. However, these explanations often leave something to be desired—quaintly reassuring that Singapore’s current condition is merely a transition between the past’s successful authoritarianism and the future’s “reasonably predictable” democracy. Such unenlightening reassurances are myopically limited both by their assumptions about Singaporean society and in their disregard for historical context, which is the key to explaining the city-state’s current shifts: slowing economic growth and an increasingly diverse political scene.
History 101
Through the lens of prominent historical discrepancies between Singapore and its economically successful peers, the political obscurities behind this divergent Asian city-state begin to unfold. Here, comparisons with other East Asian state-centered economic powers—South Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong—prove most helpful. As the Allied powers of World War II conquered bit by bit of the Japanese empire, the Soviet Union overtook Northern Korea from Japanese control, while the United States liberated the South. These two world powers then rebuilt their respective halves of the peninsula and instilled two highly dissimilar political ideologies within the same nation. This inevitably sparked the Korean War, which ended three years later with a communist North and authoritarian South (which, after three decades of political evolution—sparked by U.S. aid—became wholly democratic).
Meanwhile, across the Sea of Japan, the United States was employing troops and diplomats to negotiate Japan’s immediate military disarmament and governmental overhaul after bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although Emperor Hirohito was allowed to remain in power, Japan’s entire political and economic systems were democratized under U.S. supervision. The country then evolved into a constitutional monarchy within which the Emperor possessed little power, having bequeathed much of it to an elected prime minister and parliament. In short, the whole of Japanese government metamorphosed from a war-mongering empire into a peacefully thriving democracy, mirroring the United Kingdom. Thus, like in South Korea, the West’s involvement in post-World War II reestablishment projects laid the foundation for Japan’s modern democratic state.
As a final antithetic example, Hong Kong—the most applicable example of Singaporean divergence (because of its similarities in size, population, and historical context)—too developed into a capital of economic prosperity through the hands-on support of Western nations. This began in the mid-19^th century when Great Britain captured the territory of Hong Kong during the First Opium War, introducing Western styles of thinking about politics and commerce. After World War II, Britain regained influence over the region (following a brief period of Japanese ownership) and continued to exert its authority; however, having to focus on rebuilding Europe, Britain granted Hong Kong some autonomy. Almost a half-century later, Britain ceded Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China, but despite this new ownership under a communist government, Hong Kong still possessed a high level of autonomy and fought for Western democratic principles—a fight that continues even today.
The Black Sheep
Singapore, however, is a pariah among the East Asian Tigers. Unlike the three prior examples, Singapore matured in an entirely different manner and under entirely different supervision. While the United States and Great Britain rehabilitated Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, no one invested greatly in Singaporean democracy. Much like Hong Kong, prior to World War II, Singapore was under British control—in fact, during the previous 50 years, issues on the mainland forced Britain to reorganize trade flow through Singapore rather than Hong Kong. Consequently, its economy was mostly westernized and bound to trade routes, greatly augmenting its prosperity within the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. However, like Hong Kong and South Korea, Singapore was captured by Japan during World War II. As in Hong Kong, the Japanese instilled strict authoritarian rules that dismantled the British establishment. When World War II ended, the British returned to stabilize the island, but to a much lesser extent than in Hong Kong, since mainland China now posed greater economic promise. Inspired by a newfound fear of repression, Singaporean citizens demanded self-rule in order to escape imperialism’s all-engulfing grasp. Britain granted the island state sovereign status in 1958, and in the next year’s election, the People’s Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, seized legitimate control of the government and has maintained it for the past 56 years.
It is likely that the driving force behind Singapore’s uniqueness among Asian economic powers derives from its unique historical context of deficient post-World War aid from the West. While Japan and Hong Kong accepted democratic principles as the best route to economic salvation (with South Korea following in suit after decades of Korean war-initiated authoritarianism, necessitated by its militarily aggressive northern neighbor), Singapore rejected all future assistance from the developed world. Yet, like the others, Singapore’s economy flourished. But rather than through pure western democratic principles, it did so under the strict and unanimous governance of the People’s Action Party—what modern political scientists would deem a “soft” authoritarianism. But, one must still question why, after five decades of prosperity, the tides toward a representative government haven’t spawned in the tiny nation.
Liberalism or Authoritarianism?
Many modern political theorists postulate that Singapore will inevitably become democratic because of its economic development; however, others (noticeably fewer in number) argue that Singapore will remain as a “soft” authoritarian regime. Based on historical context, Singapore could democratize like Japan and South Korea and Hong Kong but likely will not. As much past research suggests, citizens earn more money and are better off in a typical democracy; however, a typical democracy occurs in a typical country—something that Singapore is not.
Singapore is a city-state—one more prominently equipped with local political mannerisms rather than with national ones. Because Singapore is run like a local political machine (much like modern New York City), a one-party authority not only helps to secure overall stability, but is also more probable, since local politics are contingent on party loyalties rather than political platforms (i.e. the Democrats in New York City, the People’s Party in Madrid, the Democrats in Rome). This dichotomy between purely partisan voting and more thoroughly informed voting thus reveals the political biases of modern Singaporeans. For, although Singapore’s current economic growth is slowing at a noticeable pace (as is typically expected from a maturing nation), it likely will not look to democracy to alleviate its future problems.
Furthermore, no democratic revolution will likely occur anytime soon given that Singapore’s democratic counterparts in the region are also slowing down or have already slowed down economically over the past three decades. The best example of such stunted progress is Japan, whose democratically run economy has been battling recessions since the early 1990’s. While employing the western model for democratic capitalism, the government invested money in private ventures to sponsor economic growth throughout the mid-20^th century. The demand for such funds then grew until the government could no longer subsidize the industries, resulting in long-lasting economic woes. Meanwhile, the Yen was appreciating alarmingly in its new global market, while Japanese foreign investments were yielding minimal returns. All of these mishaps ultimately precipitated the economic crash of 1992—essentially propelled by its Western democratic ideals and capitalist endeavors. Today, many Japanese citizens are even considering a shift towards more centralized, nationalistic measures in order to fashion a more economically stable political order.
With this in mind and with a history of economic prosperity and political stability behind it, Singapore cannot look to any one nation—democratic or not—as a model to solve its current and future issues. Singapore will look towards itself and perpetuate the dominance of the People’s Action Party; it will eschew the topic of full western democratization; it will continue to promote political unity and strict legal authority as a means to aid the populace. Singapore likely will not democratize, but rather will endure in its current form as long as the marginal benefits of “soft” authoritarianism persist. In most organizations, the management does not change unless absolutely necessary. Such is not yet the case of Singapore.
Image source: Wikimedia // Nicolas Lannuzel