Congress, We Have A Problem: Erosion of Institutional Norms in Congress

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While watching President Biden’s State of the Union address this past January, I was shocked by the apparent lack of civility from members of Congress. From Rep. Majorie Taylor Greene’s outbursts to Rep. Lauren Boebert’s attempt to begin a “build the wall” chant, the behavior of our elected officials was deeply inappropriate. However, this is far from the first time heckling has occurred at a State of the Union — just two short years ago, during President Trump’s 2020 State of the Union, Nancy Pelosi tore up a copy of his address four separate times during his speech on national television

This childish behavior certainly has not helped improve public ratings of Congress. In 2022, public opinion of Congress plummeted to a concerning new low of 7%. It appears Congress is having an identity crisis. In the pursuit of careerism and amidst never-ending petty banter, Congress has forgotten the constituency it exists to serve. Lofty pursuit of titles and supposed power has replaced a basic loyalty to one’s constituency. When the goal is to maximize views and likes on social media, bipartisanship does not exactly make headlines. 

Inflammatory outbursts and refusals to cooperate emulate a first-grade classroom more than the revered democratic institution our Founders envisioned. So, in this age of uncontained congressional childishness, what does it actually mean for Congress to be a successful institution? Congress must regain its intended prerogative to attract true public servants rather than power-hungry demagogues — lest it loses more validity in the watchful eye of the American public. 

The Recipe for Democracy 

Americans should know, better than most, that democratic institutions are difficult to establish and even more arduous to maintain. One only has to look as recently as former President George W. Bush’s failure to “help Iraqis build a free nation,” or the subsequent fall of the Afghan government after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, to see the challenges behind preserving democracy. This begs the question: What makes a democratic institution successful? 

Two key ingredients determine the success of a democratic institution. First, it must uphold popular sovereignty, where elected officials are accountable to the people. This principle even applies to federal republics like the United States. Second, a democratic institution must be able to balance the competing interests of its branches of government (i.e., checks and balances). 

The health of our nation depends on a purposeful Congress. According to the Founders, Congress must be “the immediate agent in the formation and execution of the national plans.” Its purpose is to “have the most frequent and most intimate connection with the people.” Yet today, just 37% of Americans can name their congressional representative. Two theoretical considerations made by our government’s Founders can help return Congress to its constitutional purpose. 

Congress lacks institutional loyalty; it no longer defends its prerogative to act independently of the executive branch. In a system of checks and balances, an unchecked executive branch poses a grave threat of democratic backsliding. It additionally has devolved into performative degeneracy; it is regarded as merely a platform for virtue-signaling rather than a reflection of the American people. Understanding the intended purpose of Congress can show how it is behaving — or failing to behave — in 2023. 

Regaining the Madisonian Prerogative

Democratic institutions, according to James Madison, rely on their institutional loyalties to ensure that one branch of government does not abuse its power. In the Federalist Papers, his proposed solution for preventing tyranny is through checks and balances, which he believed were necessary due to human nature being fundamentally selfish. However, Madison called for a system that goes beyond balancing power among three branches. He envisioned three branches that interact minimally, with each branch having ultimate loyalty to the American people, encouraging them to safeguard their goals against the others, creating a system of responsibility and accountability rather than competition or conflict.

Unfortunately, Congress presently lacks this institutional loyalty. Rather than guarding its power, it continues to willingly hand off power to the executive branch. This is evident throughout politics. In August 2021, Congress Democrats called on President Biden to extend the federal evictions moratorium that was set to expire. The CDC put the moratorium in place to help mitigate COVID-19 by allowing struggling tenants to stay in their homes. Biden extended the moratorium, allowing power to willingly transfer from the legislative to the executive branch.  However, Congress occasionally defers to the president unnecessarily. During the then-ongoing January 6th investigation, congressional Republicans refused to condemn President Trump, the leader of their party. Rather than guarding the institution of Congress, they defended partisan ideals.

When power is concentrated in one branch of government, such as the executive branch, it can be used to suppress dissent, violate civil liberties, and undermine democratic institutions. The concentration of power in the executive branch of government is especially dangerous because the president is uniquely capable of reverting to authoritarian tactics, abusing power to the detriment of citizens. Therefore, Congress must “jealously” guard their prerogatives against that of the executive, as Madison suggested.

These are only two examples of how Congress fails to reflect Madisonian institutional loyalty. The erosion of institutional liberty extends beyond Congress — sinister partisan motivations creep into judicial rulings in the Supreme Court and partisan gridlock can make compromise seem like whimsical folklore. Moreover, others will argue that executive overreach by past Presidents violates the Madisonian vision for institutions. This is not a problem specific or unique to Congress, but nonetheless an urgent concern. 

Madison warns in The Federalist Papers that “in republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.” It is imperative that Congress regains institutional loyalty because it alone is the “safeguard against the encroachments and oppressions of the executive power.” A weak legislative authority will defer to executive power, falling short of its intended purpose. 

Congressional “Telosvs. Personal Ambition

Former Arkansas senator William J. Fulbright remarked, “The Senate is, speaking broadly, a man for whom the Institution is a career in itself.” He alluded to an agreed-upon tragedy of modern American government: Many senators view their position in the Senate as a career in its own right, rather than as a means to serve the interests of their constituents. An obvious but overlooked reality is that Congress was designed to be temporary public service, not a career. Madison once issued a simple and related warning: “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” Fulbright and Madison’s insights hold true today more than ever: Senators and Representatives seem to care more about personal aggrandizement than the actual intent of the institution they serve.

If Congress must rediscover its institutional loyalty, it also must return to its founding “telos” — the ancient Greek philosophical concept of purpose or function. Thinkers like Aristotle and Plato maintained that everything in nature has a “final cause” or determinate aim, a concept that has application for American governmental institutions. Congress must rediscover its intended purpose: Representing the will of its constituents and framing policy debates around those interests. 

The telos of Congress is representing the will of its constituents and framing policy debates around those interests. Yuval Levin, American political analyst and author of “The Fractured Republic” and “A Time to Build,” affirms the Madisonian prerogative: Congress must check the executive branch, remain institutionally loyal to itself, and above all, represent the people. However, Levin argues that Congress also has another important task: directing the national conversation. 

A successful Congress will frame issues to reflect the will of the people. By promoting democratic deliberation, Congress can actually become accountable to Americans. Congress’ derailment from its original purpose is a “symptom of a larger problem within our government,” according to Levin. 

Members of Congress are constrained by increased polarization. To stay in office, members must satisfy donors, but also their party’s base — often at the price of refusing to work across the aisle to discover what Levin calls “common ground.” When the party’s national goals become these lawmakers’ priority, local institutions and communities are forgotten. Thus, disconnect and alienation plagues the relationship between lawmakers and their constituents.

To regain the people’s trust, Congress must rediscover its telos, and the desire to achieve the common good for all people must become a priority in Washington. While Congress is uniquely balanced to represent the diverse views of Americans in a vibrant, democratic community of lawmakers, it also must be responsive to the needs of American people. It cannot be responsive when its members are more concerned with careerism or national goals than the needs of their constituencies. 

Looking Forward… and Back

We do not live in an idealistic fairytale where every politician is a good-willed fairy godmother that waves a wand and remedies societal problems. Arguably, we exist in something closer to the opposite. However, for Congress to regain the Madisonian prerogative and return to its founding telos, a few concrete policy steps can be taken. 

Congress should prioritize a more thoughtful and collaborative approach to policymaking that emphasizes deliberation, compromise, and consensus-building over partisanship and gridlock. Committees should be given more authority in the legislative process to allow members to focus on specific policy areas and develop expertise in their fields. This would also help to decentralize power and reduce the influence of party leaders. A system of biennial budgeting and the introduction of strict rules to limit the use of budgetary gimmicks and accounting tricks can reduce the influence of special interests and promote fiscal responsibility. In the spirit of checks and balances, Congress should do more to hold the executive branch accountable by strengthening its oversight powers. This could include reforms to the Office of Management and Budget and the creation of a nonpartisan Congressional Oversight Commission. And of course, the question of term limits remains undecided. 

In order for Congress to move forward, it must recenter itself in its original Madisonian prerogative and intended purpose: representing the will of the constituency and doing so well. Only time will tell if this shift in attitude is feasible.

Image by Andy Feliciotti licensed under the Unsplash License.