One of the more interesting, if underreported, elements of China’s recent rise is its development of a sophisticated domestic space program. While China’s history in space goes back to the 1970 launch of their first satellite Dong Fang Hong I (“The East is Red I”), the most politically significant phase of the program began in 2003 when the Shenzou 5 (“Divine Vessel 5”) spacecraft carried Yang Liwei into Earth’s orbit, making China only the third nation to accomplish such a feat. Chinese space successes continued throughout the next 10 years, as China demonstrated capabilities such as spacewalks, orbital rendezvous and docking with the basic space station Tiangong-1 (“Heavenly Palace-1”), and unmanned Chang’e probes (named for a goddess of the moon) to lunar orbit and an asteroid.
At the time of this magazine’s publication, China will likely have launched the Chang’e 3 probe, which aims to be the first lunar lander since the USSR’s Luna 24 in 1976. In the medium term, China has publicly announced its focus on building a modular space station (an incomplete version of which is visited by Sandra Bullock in Gravity) at some point before 2024. Chinese officials have further speculated that a manned lunar landing could take place a few years after the station is complete, but delays with the Long March 5 rocket intended to ferry the parts needed for the station and landing missions—as well as the secrecy surrounding space and military projects in the People’s Republic—have made precise projections for the future difficult for foreign observers. The trajectory of Chinese space exploration is certainly impressive, but the question as to the CCP’s ultimate goal from all of this investment still remains.
The Asian Space Race
Perhaps part of the reason is economic. Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists believes that the high-profile missions described above are just a small part of China’s drive towards a “comprehensive” space program; satellite systems for communication, navigation, and observation are a crucial part of the modern economy, and China sees a strategic value in having the domestic capacity to provide these things for itself and to offer launch services to trading partners. Space tech is also famously “dual-use”: advances in rocketry needed to put a probe in orbit around the moon can be put to use in crafting more effective ICBMs, while the skills used to control probes in deep space can be used to improve systems for monitoring infrastructure and for developing more precise weapons systems.
The role of space exploration in advancing economic development and in creating proprietary military technology is clear, but the value in starting a manned space program from scratch is less so. As Dr. Dwight Perkins, professor emeritus and former director of the Harvard University Asia Center points out, much of the technology necessary for a Gemini-level program has already been developed and is readily available for use on Earth; the value of the “spin-offs” that China could receive from basic manned spaceflight would be largely in marginal improvements to existing ideas. It seems that working with Russia on more advanced future spacecraft, as Canada, Japan, and Europe currently do with the U.S. and Russia on the International Space Station, would be both more cost-effective and more likely to produce major advancements than going it alone, but China seems determined to continue on its current path. This suggests that the rationale for China goes further than basic economic considerations.
The last time a manned space program was launched was at the height of the Cold War in 1961, when cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin and astronaut Alan Shepard briefly escaped the surly bonds of Earth. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, international prestige was on the line; is it possible a similar dynamic is at play today? If it is, Dr. Perkins argues, the competitor is not an existing space power like the United States. The U.S. and Russia achieved all the milestones China has achieved decades ago, and both have the technical capacity, if not the budget or will, to make it to the moon before the Chinese can.
Instead, Perkins believes, the target is the developing world: countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America over which China seeks to exert influence. Joan Johnson-Freese, an expert on space security and a professor at both the U.S. Naval War College and Harvard, told the HPR that some of the most profound impacts of China’s investment in space have been in the developing world. India, which had long argued that space exploration was a hobby for rich nations, has turned its sights upwards as well after watching China’s success. India’s first lunar orbiter ended its mission in 2009, and on November 5 of this year, India launched a probe to Mars. Finally, the nation is currently in the planning stages for a manned orbital mission. With North Korea launching its first satellite last year, followed this year by South Korea’s launch of a rocket co-developed with Russia, and Japan increasing its own already substantial domestic space efforts, Johnson-Freese sees the makings of an “Asian Space Race”
New Kid on the Block
Despite this apparent emphasis on influencing the developing world, Marvin Kalb, professor emeritus at the Harvard Kennedy School and former CBS Moscow bureau chief, argues that China’s message to Russia and the United States should not be ignored. By entering a club that had previously been reserved for superpowers, China is declaring its international “big boy” status. Johnson-Freese makes note of this as well: the 2008 Olympics were China’s “coming out party” as a world power, and a moon landing could be the “capstone” that might grant them superpower status.
If even a small part of China’s goal in space is to send a message to the United States, it is important to examine how America is responding to that message. The general consensus is: not particularly well. Beginning in 1989 with the post-Tiananmen sanctions, the United States has had limited cooperation with China in space. Championed by longtime Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA), legal restrictions on NASA-China interactions have been primarily motivated by concerns over human rights violations and secondarily by fears of China adapting NASA technology for military use. While both Drs. Kulacki and Johnson-Freese agree that issues regarding technology transfers should be considered, the overall effect of the restrictions is, in the words of Johnson-Freese, to “shoot ourselves in the foot.”
Dr. Kulacki argues that the space sanctions effectively punish the wrong people. According to him, the Chinese Communist Party—which often justifies the ire of Congressman Wolf—gains limited domestic propaganda value from space because the high political costs of failure dissuade it from making space central to its legitimacy. The complete shut-out of China from U.S. space efforts instead punishes Chinese space scientists who might otherwise work in tandem with scientists in the United States. By blocking them out, we are “risking the opportunity to gain new friends” within China. A healthy sense of both competition and cooperation in space with China over the next few decades will no doubt revitalize the United States’ space policy, but the last thing America needs is a generation of Chinese rocket scientists with a bone to pick.
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