Qeeroo means “youth” in Oromo, the language of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group. It is also the preferred name of the young Oromo who have led anti-government protests calling for greater ethnic equality since November 2015. The protests have spread throughout Oromia and Amhara, home to the Oromo and Amhara ethnicities that constitute 34 and 27 percent of the country’s population, respectively.
Since 1991, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalist system has been led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition that technically includes political parties representing the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigrayans. Yet, because they control the military and key economic assets, the Tigrayans hold the real power in the country.
After two years of sporadic and violent protests, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, whose tenure began in 2012, abruptly submitted a letter of resignation on February 15th, prompting concerns about political instability in the regional powerhouse and second-most populous country in Africa. Hailemariam’s resignation is a moment of hope for the country, as the long-oppressed plurality Oromo may finally have the ability to pressure for real representation in Addis Ababa.
Tyranny of the Minority
Tigrayans represent only 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population but have controlled the country’s highest positions in politics and the military since the communist Derg regime was toppled in 1991. Historically, all but one of Ethiopia’s emperors from 1270 to 1974 were Amhara, and the Derg dictatorship was also led by the Amhara. But after the oppressive Derg regime lost even Amhara support, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) sparked an armed revolt and co-opted the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement into forming the EPRDF that stands to date. After defeating the Derg military, the TPLF, led by the strongman Meles Zenawi, consolidated its hold over the country, crushing any rebellious Oromo outfits that refused to support the OPDO.
For all of Zenawi’s reign, and even after his death, the TPLF has maintained control over the country’s security apparatus, financial institutions, and the executive branch. 99 percent of Ethiopian National Defense Force officers hail from Tigray, and 97 percent are from the same village. The TPLF has dominated the EPRDF and dictated its decisions, quashing dissent from the OPDO and the Amhara National Democratic Movement.
Turn of the Tide
Since 2015, the Tigrayans’ hold on power has grown increasingly shaky. After the government in Addis Ababa threatened to expand the capital city’s boundaries into Oromia, the Oromo erupted in protest against what they saw as a breach of their sovereignty. These demonstrations have spread around the country and broadened in scope to include Ethiopia’s biggest issues — ethnic inequality, a lack of democracy, and corruption. The OPDO has been reinventing itself ever since as a quasi-opposition party within the EPRDF, a phenomenon manifesting itself in the election of the outspoken, charismatic Lemme Megersa, a politician who has attacked the current regime and adopted many of the protesters’ demands, as Oromia’s Regional President.
The tide is turning in the struggle for Oromo and Amhara rights, and Hailemariam’s resignation primes Lemma and the OPDO for a major political ascendancy. The protests have forced the TPLF to release thousands of political prisoners, including major opposition leaders, attending to one of the demonstrators’ main demands. Energized by the demonstrations and Lemma’s leadership, the OPDO has begun to reassert itself as a champion of Oromo rights.
In response to past protests, Ethiopia’s parliament unanimously approved the imposition of a state of emergency in October 2016, largely a ploy to allow the TPLF to restrict human rights and crack down on dissent. In contrast, 88 lawmakers, many from the OPDO, recently voted against approving the most recent state of emergency, put into place just days after the PM’s resignation.
This newfound belligerence may be coming at just the right time. Lemma, recently elected as the OPDO deputy chairman, is being considered as a candidate to replace Hailemariam. While Lemma may be disqualified from the position because he is technically not a member of the national parliament, the OPDO chairman, Abiy Ahmed, who is also seen as a reformer, would still be in the running.
Their platform, which centers around amending the political system, creating jobs, and tackling corruption, is so popular that Lemma’s political base crosses ethnic lines. Given the cracks appearing in the EPRDF, the election of an Oromo prime minister is not improbable. This may be Ethiopia’s chance to begin to loosen the TPLF’s hold on power, selecting a leader who would refuse to be a puppet for Tigrayan interests.
In truth, simply having an Oromo prime minister will not change the fact that the Tigrayans still control the military and major economic levers in the country. However, an executive not beholden to the Tigrayan platform may allow for continued protests and pressure on the TPLF, representing a major step in the right direction for Ethiopia’s oppressed ethnic groups and finally giving the Qeeroo something they can really cheer for.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Rod Waddington
