In early January, the nation of Iraq saw days of intense violence and conflict, culminating in the capture of the Iraqi city of Fallujah by forces linked to Al-Qaeda. Fighting has raged around Fallujah and other cities in Iraq’s restive Western Anbar Province in recent weeks, and has become a three-way struggle between army forces loyal to the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, Sunni tribesmen living in Anbar, and fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (referred to as ISIS), which has a strong affiliation with Al-Qaeda.
Anbar Province borders Syria, and the breakdown of authority as a result of the Syrian Civil War has allowed fighters and weapons to move across the border with relative ease. Many of the fighters who have moved in Iraq are from ISIS, which has recently faced challenges to its authority in parts of Syria both from government forces and from other rebel groups. Al-Qaeda affiliates like ISIS have taken advantage of lawlessness around the Syria-Iraq border and elsewhere in Anbar Province to train and shelter militants. “We lost control in the rural areas of the Anbar Province a couple of years ago, really when the U.S. left. When the wide area surveillance [surveillance produced using satellites and aircraft that could cover large areas of the region] left, we didn’t know what was going on in the deep desert, and Al-Qaeda used those areas to shelter,” Dr. Michael Knights, an expert on Iraq at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, said in an interview with the HPR.
Culture Clash
The presence of Al-Qaeda and the instability in Syria were not, however, the catalysts for the collapse of government control in the cities of Anbar. A crucial reason for the fighting is lingering ethnic tensions leftover from the creation of the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government. After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government was toppled and a new government composed of the majority Shia came to power. The current government, under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has been accused by Sunnis of discriminating against them, thus fostering resentment and distrust between the two groups.
On December 29-30, Iraqi Police in the city of Ramadi moved to remove a Sunni protest camp, which was set up to protest the perceived discrimination of the Baghdad administration. This crackdown prompted a massive backlash by Sunni residents and lawmakers, leading the government to withdraw its police and soldiers. After the withdrawal, Sunni tribesmen asserted control over Ramadi, while ISIS forces, allied with some of the local tribes, took power in nearby Fallujah and repulsed government attempts to eject them.
“What we are seeing here is more of a culmination than a deterioration. This is where the trend lines have been heading. Iraq is no more dangerous today than it was yesterday, but the fighting has moved to a larger scale,” Dr. Knights explained. The situation is very similar to that between 2004 and 2006, when Al-Qaeda in Iraq launched attacks around the country while supported by a sympathetic Sunni populace in the Anbar Province. The United States was able to develop a strategy against Al-Qaeda in this period, and formed alliances with local leaders and militias in Anbar, the Sawha, to work together against Al-Qaeda. The Sawha was composed of the Sunni tribal fighters and leaders who were persuaded to switch their support from Al-Qaeda in Iraq to the American forces during what American officials term “The Sunni Awakening.”
This response offers many clues to possible strategies the Iraqi government can pursue in dealing with the crisis. “The ideal response to this situation would be what we were doing in 2006-2007, getting the Iraqi government to work with the tribes and to separate Al-Qaeda from the population, and also using high-tempo counterterrorism operations with intelligence and special forces,” Dr. Knights stated.
During the Awakening in 2006-2007, the Sawha forces changed their support from Al-Qaeda to the United States, thanks to a combination of overreach by Al-Qaeda and American political, financial, and military support. With the loss of their base among disaffected Sunnis, Al-Qaeda was unable to continue its momentum against the Shia government and the American forces. A combination of military and special operations that killed the Al-Qaeda leadership, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, decapitated the leadership of the organization in Iraq. The combination of the loss of Sunni support and counterterror operations against the leadership devastated Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Unfortunately, the combination of regional instability and ethnic tension has allowed the organization to revive.
A Winning Strategy?
The United States has indicated that it will not be deploying troops on the ground in Iraq in the fight against Al-Qaeda, with Secretary of State John Kerry saying, “This fight belongs to the Iraqis.” Despite the lack of American troops on the ground, Dr. Knights explained how the Iraqi government could proceed in the face of the current crisis, and how it may be turned into an opportunity: “The one group of people that the Sawha leaders hate more than the central government is Al-Qaeda. This gives the Iraqi government the opportunity to do the right thing and stand shoulder to shoulder and fight Al-Qaeda. In Ramadi, they are fighting side by side, and they need to do more than tactically cooperate. They need to actually work with these guys in the long term, and sit down with them, and listen to their grievances, and then do something about it.”
Working with the Sunni tribes, in the manner of the United States during the 2006-2007 campaigns against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, will give the Iraqi government the allies it needs in the Anbar Province to eject the Al-Qaeda forces from the major populated areas. It also has the potential to decrease the hostility between the Shia-dominated central government and the Sunni tribes by working together to combat a common enemy. If the central government continues to launch military attacks against the Al-Qaeda forces without also reaching out to the Sunni leaders, it will succeed in killing militants but risk higher civilian casualties and alienating the Sunni population even further. By encouraging cooperation between the Iraqi government and the Sawha, the United States can play a role in promoting both Iraqi stability and combating Al-Qaeda.
If there is no agreement and reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq, violence is likely to continue. In Dr. Knights’ words, “The one group that matters is the Shia. They will pick the next Prime Minister, and when they decide to forgive the Sunnis for the regime of Saddam, then Iraq’s situation will improve. If they do not reach this reconciliation, the problems will continue.” Hopefully the current violence will be the apex of ISIS’s influence in Iraq, and will serve as a wake-up call for the government to redouble its efforts to mediate with—and not marginalize—the Sunnis. If such reconciliation is not forthcoming, the bloodshed is only likely to increase, continuing to leave Iraq unstable and volatile for years to come.
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