The recent hiccups in U.S.-Japan relations
2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Born out of the Cold War, the agreement provided a framework under which the United States gave Japan economic opportunities and military protection in exchange for Japanese alignment with the anti-Communist bloc. Though initially met with controversy, the treaty gave rise to one of the most successful alliances in post-war history, labeled “the most important relationship in the world, bar none” by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield.
The anniversary was very nearly a dour one. Over the past two years, the relationship had suffered from former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s perceived shift away from the United States and from controversy over American military bases on the island of Okinawa. With Hatoyama out of office and his successor pledging to resolve the Okinawa issue, the alliance seems to be on the mend. Nonetheless, the cooling and apparent restoration of relations are only small parts of a more complicated picture. While Prime Minister Naoto Kan has pledged a renewal of the alliance, relations may falter from lack of high-level engagement or from mutual complacency. In order to extend the American-Japanese alliance, then, U.S. and Japanese leaders must still reposition the alliance to adapt to a multilateral, globalizing world.
New Leadership
After the election of the DPJ last year, analysts feared that the party would abandon Japan’s tradition of alignment with the United States, in favor of renewed engagement with Asia. For the better part of last year, before Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s fall from power, those worries seemed justified. When he was in the opposition, Hatoyama had fought Japanese support of American military missions; in office, he pledged to move the American base off the island of Okinawa entirely. Since Hatoyama’s departure, however, the relationship has largely warmed. New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has sought rapprochement with Washington, asserting that the bilateral relationship remains “extremely important.” More substantively, Kan has pledged support for Japanese collaboration with the American military and sought U.S. backing over Japan’s claims for the Senkaku Islands.
The DPJ’s sudden turnaround in foreign policy is not as surprising as it may seem. Susan Pharr, a professor of Japanese politics at Harvard, told the HPR, “Within the DPJ are politicians who have come from the LDP, so this is a party that isn’t coming from the left, but a middle-of-the-road party that resembles the LDP over a broad range of policy issues.” Pharr continued, “They’ve been trying to differentiate themselves in the area of security and foreign policy, but they’re naturally finding it very difficult.” As the DPJ grows more comfortable in office, then, tensions with the United States that resulted on account of Hatoyama’s actions should dissipate.
The Okinawa Factor
The renewal of the alliance most clearly shines through over the issue of the American bases on Okinawa. Since the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996, the United States has pledged to reduce its military presence on the island by relocating the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station from its position in the middle of the city and withdrawing 8,000 American marines to Guam. Hatoyama had pledged to shutter the base, and his opposition opened a Pandora’s box, as many Okinawans demanded that U.S. forces leave the island entirely. By contrast, Prime Minister Kan has pledged support for an orderly relocation process, announcing, “We have no intention whatsoever to change Japan’s current foreign policy.”
The issue may still flare up again after the Nov. 28th Okinawa gubernatorial elections, when Okinawans will decide between Hirokazu Nakaima, a supporter of the U.S. bases, and Yoichi Iha, a vehement opponent. According to Yukinori Komine, an associate with the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Okinawan elections will have important ramifications for the rest of Japan. “Unlike other prefectures, Okinawa affects the political scene at three levels—local, regional and national—so its outcome will be crucial in seeing whether things between the United States and Japan will move forward,” Komine told the HPR.
Nonetheless, the base’s importance to the overall American-Japanese relationship may be overstated. Joseph Nye, a professor of international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, described the Futenma base as “a second-order issue which has grown out of proportion to its importance.” Nye argued that America and Japan should emphasize the greater part of their agenda, “working in partnership to build a stable and prosperous East Asia,” and that Okinawa remains a mere side-issue.
The Complacency Threat
While the U.S.-Japanese relationship is stronger than it was a year ago, its long-term health still depends on the extent to which the alliance can reposition itself to meet new demands. Richard Samuels, director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, told the HPR that the two nations have utterly failed to engage each other about contemporary challenges. “The last high-level meeting between the U.S. and Japan was back in 1996, during the Clinton-Hashimoto summit. Since then, almost 15 years have elapsed and the world is very different now. It surprises me that both countries haven’t organized anything on the same level since.”
Kent Calder, director of the Japan Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, told the HPR that the problem was one of complacency. Calder called it the “quiet crisis” of the alliance. “The most important deficiency is ironically the fruit of recent apparent success. It is the lack of crisis consciousness, the perverse spirit of mutual self-congratulation, that pervades U.S.-Japan relations today.”
One sees proof of this complacency in the fact that only 39 American legislators visited Japan between 2000 and 2005, compared with 113 to China, 79 to India, and 68 to Taiwan. Such trends may be worrying for the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship.
A Renewed Alliance
There remain grounds for optimism going forward. America and Japan possess similar democratic values and the goal of seeing a peaceful, responsible China. With these shared interests, the nations are natural allies. Indeed, if both nations recognize the underlying threat of complacency and begin to conduct relations in a more deliberate manner, any threats to the alliance will subside.
As former U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer wrote in his autobiography, “I was particularly anxious to have the Japanese stop thinking of the American military as being the real United States, and the relationship between the two countries as being primarily military rather than a matter of shared ideals and common interests.” The issue of Okinawa may still flare up, and Hatoyama’s lasting influence remains to be seen. Yet if President Obama and Prime Minister Kan are able to find new means of cooperation, then the turbulence of the past year’s relations will have been a forgettable detour.
Alastair Su ’14 is a Staff Writer
Photo Credit: Flickr – M. Ashley Morgen
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