The Burmese Spring

On November 13, 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged from her villa to greet supporters after seven years of house arrest. Emblematic of Burma’s fledgling pro-democracy movement, Suu Kyi’s release was hailed by the international community and locals alike as a positive sign of change at a pivotal time in Burmese history. Following a half century of authoritarian rule, the Burmese government has recently begun what it insists is a transition from military junta to democratic civilian government.
Many observers hope that Burma’s top-down revolution will be an alternative and comparatively peaceful model for governments grappling with the social movements of the Arab Spring. But, any celebration of a “Burmese Spring” would be preemptive. Suu Kyi has declared that she will participate in upcoming April parliamentary elections, which are seen as a major test of the Burmese government’s dubious sincerity.
A Burmese Goldmine
Suu Kyi now meets a Burma that is starkly different from the one she knew before her release. Today, with major investment from China and great strategic value, Burma has a steadily growing economy, a wealth of oil and minerals, and a burgeoning middle class of industrialists and businessmen.
This renewal of economic activity in Yangon holds the possibility of major consequences for the military regime. Anticipating that corresponding positive developments will lift foreign sanctions, the government might steadily move away from its longtime economic ally, China. Previously last October, President Thein Sein surprisingly suspended the construction of a new hydroelectric dam being developed jointly with the China Power Investment Corporation. The dam’s construction created controversy when the BBC reported that perhaps 90 percent of generated electricity would go to China.
Donald Emmerson, director of the South East Asia Forum at Stanford University, says that the dam suspension represents a new model for a Burmese government concerned with reducing its dependency on China. While China’s attempts to expand its economic influence into Burma have been largely successful in the past decade, the dam’s suspension is an important signal from Burma. It behooves the Burmese military to encourage Western investment by making political concessions and diversifying the country’s economic options. But, Emmerson explains to the HPR that this pivot away from China and toward reforms could eventually endanger the military with, “a juggernaut that could destroy it. Opening the gates to investment and aid could enrich the generals, but it could also spur the growth of a new middle class that supports Aung San Suu Kyi and wants even more reform.”
The Ethnic Dilemma
According to David Steinberg, a Professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University, the oft-ignored issue of ethnic minority rights represents the most fundamental challenge for present-day Burma. Since 1949, the Karen community has carried out insurgencies in Burma’s hilly northern flank in response to its marginalization by both civilian and military governments. Especially since the 1962 military coup, the Karen and other ethnic minority groups have faced harsh discriminatory treatment from generals in Yangon.
Despite many calls to end the violence, and a stipulation by Suu Kyi that international embargoes should only be lifted once a solution to ethnic conflict is realized, violence has  broken out again in the northern Kachin state. Conversely,  recent months have seen progress in the government’s policy toward the Karen, as embodied in the declaration of a ceasefire in the longest ethnic rebellion of the modern era.
Journalistic Freedom and Political Prisoners
Despite talk about increasing channels for free speech, Burma’s advances in the realm of journalism have been among the most superficial. Reporters Without Borders’ 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index ranked Burma 169 out of 179 nations, among the ranks of Syria and North Korea. The report also notes that while the government’s efforts to reduce censorship count as improvements, Burma, “remain[s] largely under the control of an authoritarian government run by former members of the military junta, reinvented as civilian politicians.”
In a radical departure from previous state rhetoric, Tint Swe, director of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Department, suggested closing his own office this past September. However, by late January, the Burmese government had abandoned Swe’s proposed initiative, with local journalists reporting that the state had returned to heavily censoring politically-sensitive news.
Ismael credited the Burmese government’s hypocrisy to more than mere mendacity; instead, there is reason to believe there no single opinion dominates the Burmese government. Citing a familiar theme in democratization, Ismael asserts that focusing on journalistic freedom reforms will enable and encourage improvements in other problematic elements of Burmese politics, including ethnic conflicts and political prisoners.
For the time being, Reporters Without Borders has cautiously welcomed the Burmese reforms, in full recognition that they are incomplete.
Furthermore, although international observers heralded Burmese policymakers for the granting of mass amnesty to 230 political prisoners last October and 651 political prisoners on January 13, this is a small dent in a broader problem. According to the United Nations, more than 2,000 political prisoners remain in military custody.
Aung San Suu Kyi: Agent of True Change?
“Despite her international presence,” Emmerson continued, “Suu Kyi’s ability to deepen and broaden reform should not be exaggerated.” More specifically, even if she wins a parliamentary seat her efforts to bring about change there could be outvoted and overruled.
Burma’s constitution, controversially ratified in 2008 as part of the military junta’s Roadmap to Democracy, guarantees a certain number of seats for the military. With only 48 seats up for grabs on April 1st and many already occupied by pro-military parties, the National League for Democracy, Suu Kyi’s party, will fall far short of a majority, even if it wins every seat it contests. “She will be balanced on a knife edge between cooptation as a token reformer and isolation as a principled critic,” Emmerson said. “If it appears that by cooperating with the government she is giving up more than she gets, her supporters may have second thoughts. She seems to trust President Thein Sein. How much that trust is warranted remains to be seen.”
The Path Forward
U.S. and international response is crucial toward shaping the future of Burma. According to Emmerson, there are three major routes the international community can take: doing nothing, dropping sanctions completely and normalizing relations, or providing a measured response.
Europe and the U.S. have previously asserted that freeing political prisoners and reaching an agreement with ethnic minorities are prerequisites for the removal of economic sanctions against Burma. After the recent mass amnesties, President Obama authorized an easing of American economic sanctions against Burma on February 8, but it was a limited move principally designed to allow Burma to acquire help from international financial institutions like the World Bank.
On the diplomatic end, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s much-publicized visit to Burma in December has led to conversation about the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to Burma, a first since representation was downgraded to the level of Charge d’Affaires in 1988.
Ultimately, it is worth noting that if Burma’s transition proves successful, it would inspire reform in nations like Cambodia and Laos rather than Middle Eastern countries involved in the Arab Spring. But until its reforms are proven credible, Burma has little chance of serving as a model for top-down revolution.